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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a worker's compensation case involving an employee 
of Barco of Utah, who was injured while in the course of her 
employment. She claims she is entitled to compensation benefits 
for injuries allegedly resulting from the accident. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
The Administrative Law Judge entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order granting applicant's claim for compen-
sation benefits, holding that Mrs. Anderson suffered a 20% loss 
nf body function with 2. 5% permanent physical impairment attributable 
;,, the industrial injury and 15% attributable to pre-existing 
conditions. A Motion for Review of the Order was denied by the 
Industrial Commission on March 15, 1983, and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge was affirmed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order, as ilff,,,., 
by the Industrial Commission, should be upheld by the Supre:. 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 7, 1978, Sarah Ann Anderson was employed r;' 
Barco of Utah as a head presser of collars and uniforms manufacturec 
at the plant. (R, 31, 117) On the day in question, she rar, 
into the corner of a table while carrying a number of boxes, 
and experienced pain in her right knee as a result. (R, Jl, 
117) She continued to work, when an hour later she twisted he: 
right knee as she reached down for a bundle of collars to press,, 
(R, 34, 117) She suffered pain and notified her supervise:, 
who told her to continue working, so she finished the shift, 
(R, 34, 117, 118) After completing the shift, she saw Dr. Pete: 
Sundwall in Kanab, who told her to stay off her leg for a fe'•: 
days and then allowed her to return to work. (R, 35, 36, 118 
The applicant testified she was unable to return to work because 
of pain, so she consulted with Dr. Robert Allen, in RichfieJc, 
Utah, on March 18, 1978. Dr. Allen ordered x-rays of the knee 
which showed some problems. (R, 37,39,118) After showing n. 
improvement, she was examined by Dr. Craig McQueen who eventuall 
performed surgery on Mrs. Anderson on April 24, 1978. He remw 
damaged cartilage from the leg and shifted the kneecap back 
position. (R, 42, 118) The applicant subsequently had two 
on her knee which were not related to her industrial injury' 
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rather to degenerative problems involving the patellofemoral 
mechanism. (R, 118) 
Mrs. Anderson was referred to a medical panel, which 
found a 5% pre-existing permanent partial impairment for a long-
standing seizure disorder, a 2 .5% loss attributable to the industrial 
injury, and a 10% loss of body function resulting from the above-
mentioned non-industrial surgery. (R, 102, 119) This results 
in a total of 20% loss of body function, rounded to the nearest 
5%. 
Dr. Boyd Holbrook also reviewed applicant's medical 
file at the request of the State Insurance Fund. He found that 
she had degenerative joint disease of the knee and indicated 
that the episode of March 7, 1978, was probably not a significant 
factor in Mrs. Anderson's problem: "It is difficult to see that 
the minimal amount of trauma which she reported would be a significant 
factor in the condition of her knee or that it would be a significant 
factor in precipitating the knee to the condition requiring surgery." 
(R, 88) 
Mrs. Anderson's treating physician Dr. Craig McQueen, 
essentially agreed with the medical panel's evaluation with the 
exception that Dr. McQueen found a 25% permanent partial impairment 




APPELLANT'S CLAIMS ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE RECORD AND THEREFORE CANNOT 
BE CONSIDERED IN THIS APPEAL. 
In view of the fact that the medical panel hearing 
transcript was lost, it is appellant's responsibility to reconstruct I 
the record and to provide the court with some evidence to support 
her position, which appellant has not done. In fact, nowhere 
in appellant's brief is there a reference to the record in support 
of any point, and respondent asserts that it is improper for 
the applicant to make such unsubstantiated claims. For example, 
Mrs. Gardner claims that it was error to adopt the findings of 
the medical panel as opposed to the findings of her physician, 
Dr. McQueen. She asserts that "Dr. McQueen had substantialli' 
greater percentage of the permanent partial disability attributable 
to the accident, and an additional 1 1/2 to 2 years of temporary , 
total disability rating.• (Applicant's brief at 2) She alsc 
claims that "there were a number of relevant material tests thac 
the medical panel did not have when it rendered its decision.", 
(Appellant's brief at 10) However, these allegations are unsubstan· 
tiated. There are means to complete the record none of whic!i 
were done. The record merely recognizes that Dr. McQueen gav, 
a 25% disability rating as opposed to the medical panel's 'Iii 
rating. (R, 136) There is nothing in the record to indic 01 ' 
what part of Dr. McQueen's rating was attributable to the 
or Dr. McQueen's assessment of how long Mrs. Anderson sufferen 
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temporary total disability. It was applicant's responsibility 
tu see that this became part of the record below. The Utah supreme 
court has made it clear that matters which are not a part of 
the record before the Supreme Court on appeal canno"t be considered 
in connection with the appeal. Matter of Estate of Cliff, 587 
P.2d 128 (Utah 1978). See also Corbet y. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d 
378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). Since appellant raises a number of 
issues that are not found in the record, and since she has made 
no effort to supplement the record in support of these issues, 
her claims must fail. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT JUDGE FOLEY 
WAS BIASED AGAINST APPLICANT IN ANY WAY 
OR THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL OR PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR. 
The applicant would have this court believe that it 
was improper for Judge Foley to hear the case below. However, 
as previously mentioned, she presents no evidence in support 
of her position. In any event, assuming the claimed facts have 
some foundation, appellant's contentions must fail. The law 
in Utah is well-established that "a judgment should not be reversed 
in the absence of error which is substantial and prejudicial 
in the sense that there would be a reasonable liklihood of a 
different result in the absence of such error." Arnoyitz y. Tella, 
?7 Utah 2d 261, 495 P.2d 310, 312 (1972). See also Gilhespie 
K. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974). According to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure: 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion 
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of evidence, and no error or defect in any 
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted 
by the court or by any of the parties, is 
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal 
to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The 
court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not effect the substantial rights 
of the parties. U.R.C.P. 61. 
Appellant has introduced no evidence indicating that the findings 
of the Administrative Law Judge or the Industrial Commission 
would have been any different absent the alleged prejudice of 
the presiding judges, therefore their decisions must stand. 
The applicant asserts that Judge Foley failed to adopt 
her treating physician's report after he privately agreed to 
do so, and that because of this agreement her counsel did not 
request a hearing on the medical panel report. However, it woulG 
have been improper for the Judge to have privately contacted 
counsel for applicant out of the presence of the other attorneys 
involved, and the only evidence of the call is the confirmation 
letter written by Mr. Roberts. (R, 114) In any event, no ham 
resulted to Mrs. Anderson as a result of this misunderstanding, 
since she was still allowed a hearing on the medical panel report 
after Judge Foley adopted the panel's findings. 
In connection with this incident, appellant clairn° 
that Judge Foley in essence called her counsel a liar. Howeve·, 
assuming the facts asserted to be true, all that is indicct· 
is a misunderstanding between applicant's counsel and the Jud'<• 
Merely because the Judge did not recall such a conversation ana 
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dccom[Janying letter does not prove that he was inferring that 
Mr Hoberts was a liar, and there is no evidence to indicate 
l hat Judge Foley became biased because of this. In any event, 
the case law in this area indicates that the incident was harmless 
error. 1 For example, in Christensen y. Christensen, 18 Utah 
2d 315, 422 P.2d 534 (1967), one of the parties filed an affidavit 
of prejudice to remove the Judge from the case, asserting, among 
other things that "a misunderstanding of plaintiff's counsel 
in a conversation had with the court" was one of the reasons 
for filing the affidavit. at 535, 536. The Supreme Court 
held, with respect to this issue that " [I] t is obvious that the 
reason assigned has no substance, since concededly it was bottomed 
on misunderstanding." at 536. Accordingly, a misunderstanding 
between Mr. Roberts and Judge Foley is not a substantial reason 
to remove the Judge from the case. 
Another Utah case has held that, simply because the 
trial Judge stated that he did not believe the appellant's testimony 
at a previous trial does not show bias. Haslam y. Motrison, 
113 Otah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948). So, even if Judge Foley was 
essentially calling Mr. Roberts a liar, the case suggests 
that it takes more than a Judge's disbelief of a party (or a 
1(In a recent Utah case, the court has recognized that "It has 
, . become the prevailing view that most of the law concerning 
because of interest applies with equal flow 
L'l •• administrative adjudicators." Val i Conyalescent & Care 
J.ru;t1tution y. Indystrial Commission, 649 P.2d 33, 37 (Utah 1982). 
Accordingly, the above Utah cases discussing disqualification 
of a Judge are applicable to the case at bar.} 
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party's counsel, in the instant case) to prove that tlJP ,Judi, 
is biased. Neither is it enough to claim that a Judge is "somewha' 
hostile," if the record supports the judgment as in the present 
case. In Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 , 
(1952) the Court noted: 
From an examination of the voluminous record, 
it appears that there is evidence amply to 
sustain the findings and decree, eyen thoµgh 
the coµrt eyinced a somewhat hostile attitµde 
towards defendants and their coµnsel. (Emphasis 
added) 
Appellant is also concerned about Judge Foley's statement 
that it was his policy to affirm the medical panel's report, 
This statement by the Judge, if it was in fact said, was me rel; 
a comment on his past practice and was no indication of the Judge'; 
ability to weigh the evidence concerning an objection to a 
panel report. The Utah court, in supra, stated that 
a Judge is disqualified "only if he is actually biased and 
prejudiced.• Haslam y. Morrison, supra, at 523. The court further 
noted that: 
Bias and prejudice mean a hostile feeling 
or spirit of ill will toward one of the litigants, 
or undue friendship or favoritism toward 
one. The fact that a judge may have an opinion 
as to the merits of the cause or that he 
has strong feelings about the type of litigation 
involved, does not make him biased or prejudiced. 
For example, a judge with strong feelings 
about the use of liquor or violation of the 
liquor laws, is not biased against a defendant 
charged with a violation of the liquor laws, 
unless he has some active personal hostility 
toward the defendant. ..u;J. 
In any event, applicant's claims in regard to Juds• 
Foley must be denied because Mrs. Anderson failed to comply wit: 
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Huie 63 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or otherwise 
make a proper objection. This rule provides for a filing of 
an affidavit when a party believes the judge has a bias or prejudice. 
rt states further that: 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts 
and the reasons for the belief that such 
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed 
as soon as practicable after the case has 
been assi9ned or such bias or prejudice is 
.l:ulQjw. (emphasis added) 
Assuming appellant's allegations to be true, she should have 
filed an affidavit as soon as practicable after these biases 
became known at the medical panel hearing on April 16, 1982. 
As the record stands, no objection was made to Judge Foley's 
hearing the case until February 9, 1983, and this was only in 
the form of a Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission. 
(R, 139, 140) In fact, in a letter dated September 8, 1982, 
counsel for appellant wrote to Judge Foley requesting a decision 
in the case. (R, 134) Certainly appellant cannot claim that 
it was error for Judge Foley to have issued a ruling in this 
matter after she urged him to do so. 
According to Utah case law, if an affidavit of prejudice 
is filed too late there is no violation of Rule 63 (b). In Lepasiotes 
y_._ Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952), an affidavit 
of prejudice was filed and the trial court failed to disqualify 
himself. The Supreme Court affirmed this action, stating: 
It is to be noted that such affidavit was 
filed after the trial had comenced, and its 
contents had to do with matters alleged to 
have existed long before the trial and a 
statement by the court during the trial. 
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Under these circumstances, the filing o( 
such affidavit was untimely and hence Rule 
63(b), U.R.C.P., was not violated. This 
is particularly true in view of the fact 
that the evidence supported the decree regardless 
of any statements made by the court. .lQ. at 
297. 
Extending this reasoning to the present case, it followr 
that since the applicant filed no affidavit of prejudice ar,: 
didn't object to Judge Foley in any form until after the Adminis-
trative Law Judge had rendered a decision, such objection mus· 
be viewed as untimely, resulting in no violation of Rule 63(b), 
POINT III 
IT WAS NOT INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR JUDGE ALLEN TO SIGN 
AN ORDER MEMORIALIZING THE ORDER 
ISSUED BY JUDGE FOLEY. 
In reviewing the re co rd, it appears that Judge Timotb: 
C. Allen, who issued the Order dated January 25, 1983, was initial!: 
the attorney for defendant Second Injury Fund. There is a statutor: 
prohibition that reads: "Except by consent of all parties, no 
• • • Judge • • • shall sit or act as such in any action or proce-
eding: • (3) when he has been attorney for counsel for eithe: 
party in the action or proceeding.• Utah Code Ann. Section 78-7-: 
(1953). However, this provision is not absolute. The Utah Suprw 
Court has repeatedly stated that unless an error, if committed, 
would have such an adverse effect upon the trial that there 
a reasonable liklihood that a different result would have be: 
reached, the verdict must be sustained. See Rigtrup y. Stawbe.:..... 
Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977), and Paull Y ZiQIL 
First National 18 Utah 2d 183, 417 P.2d 759 (1966). Accardi: 
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Lo the evidence, there is no reasonble liklihood that had Judge 
1111en not been assigned to this case, the result would have been 
different. Judge Allen merely put in written form what had already 
been decided by Judge Foley at the time of the medical panel 
hearing. The re co rd indicates that at the time of the medical 
panel hearing, Judge Foley informed appellant that the findings 
of the medical panel would be admitted into evidence and that 
the applicant's objections would be dismissed. (R, 136) Judge 
Allen's order dated January 25, 1983, was in response to Mr. Robert's 
letter to Judge Foley requesting a decision in the case. (R, 
134) As noted in Judge Allen's order: 
After hearing the testimony of the treating 
physician, the panel chairman did not change 
his opinion regarding the applicant's impairment. 
It appears the panel reviewed all of the 
medical evidence, the medical panel report 
should be admitted into evidence, and the 
objections filed by the applicant should 
be dismissed. It appears fr:om the file that 
the applicant's counsel was adyised of this 
fact at the termination of the hearing but 
so that the record may be clear an Order 
to that effect will be issued. (Emphasis 
added) (R, 136) 
It is clear that it was harmless error for Judge Allen 
to have issued the foregoing order first of all, because he was 
merely making a record of Judge Foley's decision and did not 
exercise any discretionary function, and secondly, because there 
is substantial evidence to support this decision, considering 
the medical panel's findings and the coinciding report of Dr. 
Holbrook. (R, 87, 88, 97-103) 
Appellant also claims that since the transcript of 
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the medical panel hearing was lost, she should be entitled 
a new hearing. (appellant's brief at 16, 11) In support o: 
this contention she cites Reliance National Life Insyrance 
y, Caine, 20 Utah 2d 427, 439 P.2d 283 (1968). The case 
granted a new trial because the incomplete record of the testimon. 
did not support the trial court's findings and judgment, Ir 
the instant case, although the record is incomplete, there 
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sufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding in the 
form of medical reports and the Administrative Law Judge's Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Therefore, a new hearino 
is unnecessary. 
POINT IV 
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW DICTATES 
THAT THE COMMISSION'S DECISION BE UPHELD, 
According to the Utah Code Annotated, this Court ma; 
set aside the Commission's ruling only upon finding: "(l) That 
the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; [ori 
(2) That the findings of fact do no support the award." Utal. 
Code Ann. Section 35-1-84 (1953, as amended). In addition, th1, 
Court stated in Ogden Standard Examiner y. Industrial Commission, 
663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983): 
Our inquiry is whether the Commission's findings 
are "arbitrary and capricious," or "wholly 
without cause" or contrary to the "one inevitable 
conclusion from the evidence" to support 
them. Only then should the Commission's 
findings be displaced. 
Martinson y. W.M. Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256, 258-259 (Ut,, 
1980), also discussed the appropriate standard of review as follows 
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See also; 
When the Commission remains unpersuaded on 
a question of fact, this Court does not disagree 
therewith and compel such a finding unless 
the evidence is such that all reasonable 
minds would so find, and the court would 
thus so rule as a matter of law. On the 
contrary, if there is a reasonable basis 
in the evidence (or lack of evidence) such 
that reasonable minds acting fairly thereon 
could remain unpersuaded, this Court does 
not upset the determination made. 
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Manfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981); Clinger y. Industrial Commission, 571 P.2d 1328 
(Utah 1977); Sayage y. Industrial Commission, 565 P.2d 782 (Utah 
1977). 
The foregoing standard of review dictates that the 
Commission's decision be upheld. The Utah Code states that; 
The commission, upon referral of a case to 
it by an administrative law judge, or upon 
a motion being filed with it to review its 
own order, or an administrative law judge's 
supplemental order, shall review the entire 
record made in said case, and, in its discretion, 
may hold further hearings and receive further 
evidence, and make findings of fact and enter 
its award thereon. The award of the commission 
shall be final unless set aside by the Supreme 
Court as hereinafter provided. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.54 (1953, as amended). This statute 
provides that the commission is to review the record and has 
the discretion to receive further evidence if it is offered. 
The applicant has already been provided with the safeguard of 
this three-man panel who evaluated the evidence, and their decision 
s h<Jul d stand. The final decision in any case before the Commission 
made by the three Commissioners. If a Motion for Review is 
filed, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order become 
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advisory in nature. The Commission reached an independent decisio,, 
as provided by statute and awarded significant benefits to u,, 
appellant. She is simply dissatisfied and wants more. 
The facts must be interpreted by the appellate court 
with all inferences favorable to sustaining the trier of fact, 
The appellant asks this Court to reweigh the facts. The facts 
found by the Administrative Law Judge were based not just ot 
what was said, but on his observations of the witnesses and should 
be accorded great weight. The Commission's decision was based 
on substantial facts and the appropriate law was applied. Th; 
holding was not arbitrary, capricious, wholly without cause, 
or in excess of the Commission's powers, and the evidence presented 
by the applicant is far from "substantial" and "uncontradicted,' 
It is within the discretion of the Administrative La• 
Judge to adopt the findings of an impartial, disinterested medical 
panel as opposed to the plaintiffs personal physician. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's decision should be upheld. There 
is nothing in the record to indicate that either Judge Fole1 
or Judge Allen harbored any kind of bias or prejudice against 
the applicant or her attorney. That prejudice, if any, was cu:ei 
by the Comrniss ion's review of the case. No claim is made thr 
the Commissioners were biased against the appellant. More impt' 
tantly, there is no evidence that indicates a different 
would have been reached had another Administrative law Judgf 
heard the case at bar. 
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